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Wittgenstein and the Memory Debate1 
 
Danièle Moyal-Sharrock 
 
Abstract: In this paper, I survey the impact on neuropsychology of Wittgenstein‟s 
elucidations of memory. Wittgenstein discredited the storage and imprint models of 
memory, dissolved the conceptual link between memory and mental images or 
representations and, upholding the context-sensitivity of memory, made room for a 
family resemblance concept of memory, where remembering can also amount to 
doing or saying something. While neuropsychology is still generally under the spell of 
archival and physiological notions of memory, Wittgenstein's reconceptions can be 
seen at work in its leading-edge practitioners. However, neuroscientists, generally, are 
finding memory difficult to demarcate from other cognitive and noncognitive 
processes, and I suggest this is largely due to their considering automatic responses as 
part of memory, termed nondeclarative or implicit memory. Taking my lead from 
Wittgenstein's On Certainty, I argue that there is only remembering where there is 
also some kind of mnemonic effort or attention, and therefore that so-called implicit 
memory is not memory at all, but a basic, noncognitive certainty. 
 
Introduction 
 
There is the idea that for memory the thing must be 
written in the brain. But need memory be like 
reading old writings? (LPP 90) 
 
Explicit reference to Wittgenstein is made in the psychological literature on memory, 
but perhaps not enough to warrant the claim which I want to make here, that his 
thought has infiltrated and decisively impacted the subject. And yet, to speak of 
Wittgenstein's contribution to the memory debate is to speak of a philosopher's 
elucidation, which is to say that even where the elucidation is not always or fully 
acknowledged, it can have unsettled the fundaments and reset the direction of 
research. It would take a separate study to fathom how philosophy does make such a 
mark on the (human) sciences, but in Wittgenstein's case, the mystery dissipates when 
we realize that his contribution is better measured in terms of a paradigm shift than by 
                                                 
1 I am greatly indebted to Jason Leboe, Steve Lindsay, Ulrich Miller and Tim Racine for their 
invaluable comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I am also grateful to audiences at the universities 
of Barcelona and Hertfordshire. 
  
 
2 
way of explicit recognition2. So that psychology can have changed course whilst not 
necessarily aware of the source of change. 
 Wittgenstein has produced this paradigm shift by shedding suspicion on, and 
hence destabilizing, Cartesian premises of thought and Platonic methods of thinking. 
He has achieved this through a demystification of 'the inner' and a correlated emphasis 
on action; a resistance to explanatory ghostly mental processes that themselves remain 
unexplained; and an unprecedentedly broad appeal to context or use in the 
determination of meaning, understanding, and memory. Because of Wittgenstein, 
physicalists and functionalists throughout the humanities and the sciences have had to 
abandon the quest for neat, unitary, and closed concepts and accommodate the 
ineluctable input of broad context into their models – indeed, going as far as seeking 
to physiologically incorporate it in their models; as, for instance, Alan Parkin who 
claims that the diencephalic region may be 'crucial for enabling context to be 
incorporated into memory' (1999, 12). Neuroscientists have also started trading 
ontologically full-blown entities (e.g. the will, intention, expectation) for ways of 
acting; and biologically full-blown entities (e.g. memory) for capacities.  
 The immediate concern of this paper is to show how Wittgenstein's rejection 
of the old models and his conceptual elucidation of memory have impacted on 
neuroscientific research, and should continue to do so. As we shall see, leading-edge 
neuroscientists are coming to the same conclusions about memory that Wittgenstein 
came to more than half a century ago. In that light, whether we choose to see 
Wittgenstein as having merely anticipated or actually impacted that research, his as 
yet unechoed thoughts on memory will seem all the more worthy of attention.  
 I begin, in the first two sections, by highlighting Wittgenstein's insights, which 
take the form both of questionings and of outright claims on memory. The third 
section comprises a brief account of current neuroscientific conceptions of memory. 
In the fourth section, I underline the problem perceived by some neuropsychologists 
in calling implicit memory systems, memory systems at all. I then show how the 
noncognitive certainty depicted by Wittgenstein in On Certainty provides a 
revolutionary and viable alternative to so-called 'implicit memory'. In section 5, I 
                                                 
2 Though there has been that too: e.g. Chapman, M. & Dixon, R. (eds) Meaning and the Growth of 
Understanding:Wittgenstein's Significance for Developmental Psychology (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 
1985). 
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conclude with a proposal that we not attribute to memory, or call mnemonic, any 
activity that requires no effort or attention.  
 
1. Clearing the Way: Memory Traces & Memory Storage 
 
Whatever the event does leave behind in the 
organism, it isn't the memory.  (RPP I, 220) 
 
In 1946-47, Wittgenstein wrote the following passage: 
 
I saw this man years ago: now I have seen him again, I recognize him, I 
remember his name. And why does there have to be a cause of this remembering 
in my nervous system? Why must something or other, whatever it may be, be 
stored-up there in any form? Why must a trace have been left behind? Why 
should there not be a psychological regularity to which no physiological 
regularity corresponds? If this upsets our concepts of causality then it is high time 
they were upset. (RPP I, 905) 
 
It is passages like this that have earned Wittgenstein the label: 'behaviourist' whilst 
also perpetuating the impression that he was on an exclusively deconstructive 
mission, not concerned with offering constructive alternatives to the myths he was 
debunking. Certainly, Wittgenstein wants to alert us to the possibility that our 
conceptions of the mental are nothing but preconceptions: 'It is thus perfectly possible 
that certain psychological phenomena cannot be investigated physiologically, because 
physiologically nothing corresponds to them' (RPP I, 904; my emphasis); but his 
'physiological agnosticism', as Michel ter Hark calls it (1995, 115), is not all-
encompassing:  
 
No supposition seems to me more natural than that there is no process in the 
brain correlated with associating or with thinking; so that it would be impossible 
to read off thought-processes from brain-processes. I mean this: if I talk or write 
there is, I assume, a system of impulses going out from my brain and correlated 
with my spoken or written thoughts. But why should the system continue further 
in the direction of the centre? Why should this order not proceed, so to speak, out 
of chaos? (RPP I, 903) 
 
Wittgenstein‟s intention here – or ever – is not to reject a psychophysical correlation 
between the brain and our mental activities; on the contrary, he assumes such a 
correlation. What he does reject is a 'psycho-physical parallelism' (RPP I, 906); that 
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is, an isomorphic correlation (as Köhler would have it) between brain processes and 
thoughts or memories: 
 
… nothing seems more possible to me than that people someday will come to 
the definite opinion that there is no copy in either the physiological or the 
nervous systems which corresponds to a particular thought, or a particular idea, 
or memory3'  (LW I 504; original emphasis).  
 
Wittgenstein is not denying that we need brain activity for thought, and in that limited 
sense, remembering is causally dependent on the brain – on brain structures in 
different brain areas and on synaptic modifications in these areas – but it does not 
follow that these structures are representations of particular memories, stored and 
encoded in the brain. We must beware of confusing brain processes with thought 
processes: 
 
Even if we knew that a particular area of the brain is changed by hearing God 
Save the King and that destroying this part of the brain prevents one's 
remembering the occasion, there is no reason to think that the structure produced 
in the brain represents God Save the King better than Rule Brittania. (LPP 90) 
 
 What Wittgenstein is, in fact, rejecting is the representational theory of mind, 
which stipulates that we need to have representations in the brain in order to 
remember, think etc. To think it can be possible 'to read off thought-processes from 
brain processes' (RPP I, 903) is to conflate brain reading with mind reading4, and 
retention with physical storage. But as Bennett and Hacker point out, although storage 
may sometimes imply retention, retention does not imply storage: 
 
Memory, being the retention of knowledge acquired, is the retention of an 
ability to just the extent that knowledge itself is an ability – but it is not the 
storage of an ability. One may acquire and retain an ability, but that does not 
imply storage. For there is no such thing as storing an ability, even though there 
is such a thing as retaining the neural structures that are causal conditions for the 
possession of an ability. … To remember that p is to possess the information that 
p, but it is not to store or contain the information that p. One stores the 
                                                 
3 In a paper of this length, I can only point to the ambiguity of the word 'memory' and not attempt to 
clarify it. In perusing the literature, it has seemed to me that this ambiguity and the frequent 
interchangeability of 'memory' with the equally ambiguous 'remembering', have obstructed research. A 
conceptual elucidation of these terms would hugely benefit the neuroscience of memory. The only 
elucidatory effort I have found is Endel Tulving's inelegant 'remembery' to denote the neural record of 
encoded information (1993, 294). 
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information that p if, for example, one writes it down, and stores the inscription 
in a filing cabinet or computer which then contains it. ((2003, 164-65)  
 
(I shall later argue that remembering that p is more than possessing the information 
that p.)  
 The brain, then, is a mechanical enabler, not the storehouse and codifier of our 
memories. Representationalism is the product of a misconstrued and mislocated 
causality. But as well as this misleading view of causality, which conflates causal 
conditions with causal representations, a narrow view of causality compounds our 
misconceptions of memory: we are loathe to envisage a causation that is not 
physiological. We therefore not only mistakenly take the brain to be recording what 
we see in an isomorphic trace or „engram‟5, we also see this trace as having an 
activating function: it acts as mediator and activator between the original event and 
our ability to call it to mind. So that every time someone remembered an event, 
besides representing it, the trace would also select, decode and activate the memory. 
In this mediating capacity, the trace would play, for memory, a role analogous to that 
attributed to the pineal gland in our interactions between mind and matter/brain. 
 But, to localize (rightly or wrongly) a process, capacity or faculty is not yet to 
explain it6. The notion of memory traces seems to explain the source of memory, but 
all it does is offer the semblance of a physiological grip on a seemingly mystifying 
faculty; and so, we are left with what Norman Malcolm calls 'an illusion of 
explanation' (1977, 102). Wittgenstein's diagnosis of the need to postulate a 
physiological mediator between mind and brain is that our conception of causality is 
too narrow to admit a causality between psychological phenomena which is not 
mediated physiologically without this implying a belief in a gaseous mental entity (cf. 
RPP I, 906). A trace is required because, as Malcolm puts it, '"action at a distance" is 
a repugnant idea' (1977, 178). But, in fact, asks Wittgenstein: 'Why should not the 
initial and terminal states of a system be connected by a natural law, which does not 
cover the intermediary state?' (RPP I, 909). That is, in cases like someone's excessive 
ambition causing their loneliness; or greed causing someone to become corrupt, no 
                                                                                                                                           
4 And thereby to make a category mistake; for the brain is a material object, the mind a capacity. 
5 An engram is 'the transient or enduring change in our brain that results from encoding an experience‟ 
(Shacter 1996, 58). 
6 As David Stern puts it: '… postulating a place where mind meets matter is a deus ex machina which 
does not solve the problem, for it does nothing to explain how this interaction is possible' (1991, 205). 
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physiological connection obtains, though many psychological connections do (and 
they are not gaseous: we know that greed can move people to criminal thoughts and  
criminal behaviour). Similarly, no physiological connections link my last year's trip to 
Cambodia to the numerous recollections I have had of it since. 
 What, before Wittgenstein, is not envisaged, is that we make the connection. 
In fact, to suggest that the brain 'remembers' is to attribute to it an ability that only 
beings possess, and to commit what Bennett and Hacker call „the mereological 
fallacy‟ – the fallacy of ascribing to a part of a creature (e.g. the brain) attributes that 
can logically only be ascribed to the creature as a whole (e.g. the human being)7. 
Memory is an ability, and it is an ability that beings have, not traces or brains. For, 
writes Wittgenstein, 'even if [remembering] showed us scenes with hallucinatory 
clarity, still it takes remembering to tell us that this is past' (RPP II, 592); it is not 
'some feature of our memory image that tells us the time to which it belongs' (LWII, 
5). And, he goes on: 'if memory shows us the past, how does it show us that it is the 
past? It does not show us the past. Any more than our senses show us the present' 
(RPP II, 593). It 'takes remembering to tell us that this is past' (RPP II, 592; my 
emphasis), and remembering is done by a person. 
It is in this Wittgensteinian vein that Gianfranco Dalla Barba argues that there 
are no such things as mental representations or memory engrams because there is no 
homunculus there to interpret them and to provide memory traces with their 
relationship to a past event. Dalla Barba contends that current theories of memory are 
based on a paradox – what he calls the memory trace paradox; and that they trade on 
what he refers to as the fallacy of the homunculus (2000, 138-9). He argues that any 
theory which bases the possibility of recollection on the preservation of an event 
inside a trace is prey to the misleading assumption that time can exist in things. But of 
course, things are not in themselves temporal; 'they acquire a temporal dimension 
only in the presence of a person who goes to the trouble of making them temporal' 
(ibid., 139).  
 The paradox fleshed out by Dalla Barba is that the past is seen to derive from 
present elements (traces). But how is this done? This is where the homunculus comes 
                                                 
7 (2003, Part I, Chapter 3). A fallacy first noted by Aristotle: 'Yet to say that it is the soul which is 
angry is as inexact as it would be to say that it is the soul that weaves webs or builds houses. It is 
doubtless better to avoid saying that the soul pities or learns or thinks, and rather to say that it is the 
man who does this with his soul' (De An 408b12-15); and then Wittgenstein: „Only of a human being 
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in. Inasmuch as for something to be called memory it must be 'correct' memory and 
not confabulation or false memory, recollection must result from certain selection and 
verification mechanisms of the memory trace that are not subjective (i.e. voluntary 
and conscious). But to accept the hypothesis of unconscious monitoring mechanisms 
is precisely to fall into the homunculus fallacy: 'the contradiction of postulating the 
existence of a type of unconscious consciousness – unconscious monitoring 
mechanisms endowed with intentionality that select, evaluate, and reject false 
memories and provide conscious consciousness with only real memories' (ibid., 145). 
This is to attribute intentionality (i.e. conscious selection, decision, rejection) to an 
unconscious process. Nothing has been gained, since we find ourselves with an 
unconscious made up of the same elements as a conscious subject; and what we had 
invoked to explain conscious memory now itself requires an explanation (ibid., 146-
7). What Dalla Barba has done here is flesh out the Wittgensteinian insight that 
remembering can only be done by a person. 
 The most pervasive conception of memory is that of a storage space in which 
representations of past events are stored. Here, writes Wittgenstein in the Brown 
Book, remembering is thought of as 'a peculiar state of the person's brain' (BrB 118) 
paradigmatically resulting from a process of comparison of reality with a stored 
picture or representation (BrB 85-6). Of course, we do sometimes have mental 
pictures that help us remember, and we do compare these with reality, but because 
such mental images sometimes exist, we think that remembering necessarily involves 
them (RPP I, 1050) and essentially consists in comparison and identification. But as 
early as 1933-34, Wittgenstein rejects this unitary model of memory. In the Ambrose 
Lectures, he writes: 
 
Different sorts of memories are to be distinguished. One kind passes in time, 
cinematographically. Another is like an image given all at once, but afar off. And 
we must not fail to take account of the kind of memory which consists in 
remembering a poem or tune rather than some event of the past. In these cases "to 
remember it" means "to be able to reproduce it". (AWL 56) 
 
 There is no one conception, picture or metaphor that will render the 
multifarious ways in which we remember something and, more importantly, 
Wittgenstein unprecedently affirms that, in remembering, our behaviour – what we 
                                                                                                                                           
and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees, is blind; 
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say and do – is just as important as what we 'see'; as, that is, any introspection or 
retrospection that might occur: 'The memory image and the memory words are on the 
same level' (RPP I, 1131). 
 
2. Wittgenstein's lead: memory as a way of acting 
 
Difficulties in philosophy constantly occur in cases 
where there is claimed to be a special state of mind for 
which a word stands. The further one goes from states of 
mind to activities, say, the simpler the physical 
difficulties become. (AWL 56) 
 
Whereas we feel that saying or doing something cannot be all there is to memory; that 
it leaves out the essential feature of the mental process of memory and gives us only 
an accessory feature (cf. BrB 86), Wittgenstein stresses that 'memories … in language 
are not mere threadbare representations of the real experiences'8 (PG 131), but that 
words, as well as gestures, can constitute remembering. Remembering can amount to 
'doing something' such as reciting a poem by heart or fetching someone's key for 
them; just as recognizing someone can consist in saying "Hello!" to them in words, 
gestures, facial expressions, etc. (BrB 165-6):  
 
Remembering, then, isn't at all the mental process that one imagines at first 
sight. If I say, rightly, "I remember it," the most varied things may happen; 
perhaps even just that I say it. (PG § 42) 
  
Wittgenstein is not suggesting that there can be no mental process of remembering. 
He is rejecting only that 'peculiar‟ mental state which is thought to necessarily occur 
along with or in advance of the expressions (utterances, gestures etc.) of memory. For, 
there is in fact nothing that necessarily prefaces, accompanies or causes any 
remembering behaviour, such as saying a poem by heart: 
 
Note also how sure people are that to the ability to add or to multiply or to 
say a poem by heart, etc., there must correspond a peculiar state of the person's 
brain, although on the other hand they know next to nothing about such psycho-
physiological correspondences. (BrB 118) 
 
                                                                                                                                           
hears, is deaf; is conscious or unconscious‟ (PI 281). 
8 Indeed, Wittgenstein even suggests that the capacity for memory necessitates the capacity for 
linguistic expression: 'Anyone with a soul must be capable of pain, joy, grief, etc. etc. And if he is also 
to be capable of memory, of making decisions, of making a plan for something, with this he needs 
linguistic expression' (LW II, 67). 
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 On Wittgenstein's view, we are warranted in speaking of a memory act if by it 
we do not mean a ghostly, amorphous mental event that necessarily accompanies or 
causes an expression or act of recall: 
 
In remembering a poem we do not first visualize the printed poem and then 
say it. We simply start off by saying it, and the puzzling thing is the lack of any 
transition. (AWL 56) 
If someone remembers his hope, on the whole he is not therefore 
remembering his behaviour, nor even necessarily his thoughts. He says – he 
knows – that at that time he hoped. (RPP I, 468; my emphasis) 
 
These hardly resemble mental consultations of mental archives. 
  Wittgenstein's major contribution to the elucidation of the concept of memory 
is his discrediting the picture of memory as information storage and boldly replacing 
it with the idea that memory is nothing but an ability and that, in some contexts, 
remembering amounts to a way of acting; that is, to an act or expression which does 
not result from introspection or retrospection (e.g. BrB 85). The  input of context is 
essential here. What gives a gesture or an utterance their mnemonic status is not any 
property they may have, or any mental representations they are based on, but their 
context: it is context that makes an act (say, a smile or a nod) a memory act, rather 
than, say, an act of politeness. As Malcolm suggests: „A smile and a greeting would 
reveal recognition in one context, but just friendliness in another‟ (1977, 53). 
 Since Wittgenstein, neuroscientific theory on memory has evolved, though not 
in choral unison. If 'scientists agree that the brain does not operate like a camera or a 
copying machine' (Schacter 1996, 40), most of them still speak of memory as stored 
and encoded9 even as they also speak of it as an ability. Although, as we have seen, 
the science on memory is catching up with Wittgenstein's insights, Dalla Barba‟s 
revolutionary stride is not the norm. This is not to say that he is a maverick, but let‟s 
have a look at the mainstream, before going on to more Wittgenstein-inspired 
conceptions of memory. 
 
3. Current Neuroscientific conceptions of memory 
 
3.1 The Multiple Systems approach: classifications of memory   
                                                 
9 E.g. Tulving, who speaks of 'stored information' in some memory systems as 'representational – 
isomorphic with what is, or could be, in the world' (2005, 11). 
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In neuropsychology, the notion of memory as a single faculty of the mind has mostly 
given way to a multiple systems or structuralist approach, where memory is no longer 
seen as stored in one memory system, but in different 'storage sites', corresponding to 
various memory systems.  
 A major distinction was drawn in 1972 by Endel Tulving between what he 
called episodic (or autobiographical memory)10 and semantic memory. Episodic / 
autobiographical memory is memory for personally-experienced events. It enables us 
to answer questions such as 'What did you have for breakfast?' or 'Where did you park 
your car?' and is associated with a qualitatively distinct consciousness or experiential 
awareness. Semantic memory comprises the general, basic, stable knowledge about 
the world and language that we share with our community, such as knowing the 
meaning of the word 'bottle', what a stop sign means, or what we do in a restaurant. 
Semantic memory is of things we recall without any sense of when we learned or 
experienced them. 
 Yet, classification between episodic / autobiographical and semantic memory 
has proved problematic. For one thing, 'semantic memory also forms the basis for a 
good deal of personal autobiographical knowledge' (Schacter 1996, 151); and for 
another, some items of allegedly autobiographical memory, such as telling someone 
your name, do not require experiential awareness at recall. In 1992, Alan Baddeley 
asked: 
 
If you tell me your name, is that a piece of autobiographical memory? If you 
remember a list of words I have just presented, is that autobiographical memory? 
(Baddeley 1992, 13) 
 
Finding it difficult to neatly distinguish between episodic and semantic 
memory, and finding also that these did not cover all types of memory, 
neuropsychologists effected a more comprehensive and viable division between 
declarative (or cognitive memory) – which subsumes both the episodic / 
autobiographical and semantic memory just mentioned – and nondeclarative (or 
procedural memory11). Declarative memory, also defined as a 'knowing that', is a 
memory for facts and events that can be consciously accessed (inspected) and 
verbalised (declared) irrespective – now – of whether they are autobiographical 
                                                 
10 Though this interchangeability is now being questioned; cf. Tulving (2002), 271. 
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recollections or pieces of general knowledge (Parkin 1997, 20). It is sometimes also 
called 'explicit memory' (Squire 1999, 521). Nondeclarative / procedural memory is 
viewed as an action system or a know-how: its operations are expressed in 
performance and can occur independently of cognition; they do not require the kind of 
conscious awareness that characterizes other forms of memory (Tulving 1993, 286). 
Not consciously accessible or verbalized, nondeclarative memory is used in acquiring, 
retaining and performing cognitive, motor and perceptual skills (e.g. speaking your 
native language, riding a bicycle, recognizing faces); it is involved in training and the 
development of habits and is sometimes also called 'implicit memory' (Squire 1999, 
521, 390).  
 Besides persistent problems of overlapping classifications, a more 
fundamental perplexity is plaguing neuroscientists. They are not always clear, 
consistent or sure about whether these classifications are meant to refer to biological 
parts of the brain, or are simply theoretical machinery: 'No one has much doubted the 
usefulness of the concept of episodic memory for classificatory ("bookkeeping") 
purposes, but there has been considerable resistance to the idea that it represents 
anything special in biological reality', writes Tulving (2005, 8). The considerable 
resistance he is referring to comes from (Neo-)functionalists, the new contenders in 
the memory arena. Countering the general assumption that memory systems refer to 
biologically real entities or structures, they claim that distinctions between memory 
systems are not based on a direct morphological analysis of the structure of memory, 
but are in fact derived from a functional or task-based analysis; and that this leads to a 
fundamental circularity in the explanation of memory. As this suggests, the new 
debate on memory is between multiple systems analysts (structuralists) and 
functionalists; unitarians are fading out of the picture. 
 
3.2 Functionalism: memory as an ability and an activity 
 
[…] remembering is something a person does. 
Ian Hunter (1957), 18 
 
In spite of their name, (neo-)functionalists, are not to be associated with 
Functionalism à la Fodor. For them, the major problem with system-based approaches 
is that these take memories to be concrete entities instantiated in a mental or neural 
                                                                                                                                           
11 In fact, 'nondeclarative memory' is a larger category, which subsumes procedural memory, but these 
terms are often used interchangeably, and I will use them thus here. 
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representation. In this, multiple analysts miss the very nature of memory, because to 
see memory in a representation is to freeze in time and space what is in essence a 
fluid activity that is spread across both (Toth & Hunt 1999, 256, 264): 
 
Like walking, memory is a dynamic event that exists only in its operation. 
[…] one could say that when we are not experiencing (or recollecting) a prior 
event, or otherwise being ('implicitly') influenced by that event, memory is, 
'strictly speaking, non existent'12. (Ibid., 257) 
 
 Functionalists hold that memory is an ability that manifests itself in action: 
'memory is not an abstracted copy or representation of some previous content but is 
simply the set of operations used in dealing with [an] event. There is nothing else' – 
(ibid., 263; my emphasis). As Ian Hunter, functionalist before his time, remarks: in 
testing someone's claim that they have an excellent memory, we do not observe 
anything which could be called a memory, but watch the person as he does something, 
namely repeat or try to repeat the page he has read: 'In short, we have concerned 
ourselves not with an object but with activity; not with his memory but with his 
activities of learning and remembering' (1957, 13). This smacks of Wittgenstein's and 
Ryle's de-reification of intentional concepts, and of Wittgenstein‟s explicit 
rapprochement between memory and acting. Indeed, Norman Malcolm's book on 
memory – itself heavily indebted to Wittgenstein – is referenced in Toth and Hunt's 
paper. 
 Most neuroscientists, now speak of memory as an ability. This should 
preclude – but unfortunately does not – their also regarding memory as stored; only 
functionalists seem to have rejected the notion and image of memory storage, and 
speak exclusively of memory as an ability or function, and its occurrences as activities 
or (trans)actions. On the functionalist view, then, memory is an ability which 
manifests itself as a transaction between a person and a context of recall, or 'retrieval 
environment' (Toth & Hunt, 263). Indeed, memory is seen as no longer definable 
outside a 'retrieval' environment: 
 
When we say that memory reflects an interaction between a person and a 
retrieval environment, we mean quite literally that memory cannot be discussed 
                                                 
12 Cf. also Hunter: although everyday speech suggests that memory is an object we possess in the same 
way as we possess a head or a big toe, 'it is true, although alarming, to say that there is no such thing as 
memory' (1957, 13). 
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in the abstract, outside of the context of retrieval cues and […] the goals of the 
remember. (ibid., 258) 
 
 There is no question, then, that Wittgenstein's deflation of representationalist 
accounts of memory and its correlated emphasis on the context-sensitivity, or indeed 
the contextuality or situatedness, of memory have informed theorists and prompted, in 
Toth and Hunt‟s words, 'the relocation of memory from something that exists “in” the 
person or brain to something that obtains in the interaction between the person (and 
their brain) and the environment in which acts of memory occur' (ibid., 257).  
 Far from the 'snapshot' account of memory, the functionalist approach defines 
memory as „a doing‟ (ibid., 255). By this, it is often meant that memory is situated or 
external. I shall not here enter the buoyant and variegated field of embodied or 
embedded or extended mind, but one direction of research might be worth noting, in 
which memorization is viewed as imprinting-like learning behavior; and where 
emphasis is laid on the role that an agent's morphodynamics and situatedness play in 
the generation of such behavior (Izquierdo-Torres & Harvey 2006). This is 
foreshadowed by Wittgenstein's insight that remembering is often prompted by or 
embedded in certain acts, as expressed in this passage from the Lectures on 
Philosophical Psychology: 
 
I draw a curve on paper when the man speaks; when I trace the curve again I 
can repeat the sentence; but the curve can't be read as a code. (LPP 90) 
  
Retracing the curve is here a necessary condition for recall, but Wittgenstein insists 
that it is not any representative nature the curve would have acquired that makes it 
thus necessary – 'the curve can't be read as a code'. Nor would Wittgenstein have 
agreed with extended mind theorists that such examples of situated and embodied 
memory are mere cognitive scaffolding, or that they are, as writes Andy Clark, 'best 
seen as alien but complementary to the brain's style of storage and computation' 
(1997, 220; original emphasis). For Wittgenstein, retracing the curve can be a 
sufficient condition for recall.  
 In a passage of the Remarks on Philosophical Psychology, Wittgenstein 
imagines someone making marks and lines on paper that will help him remember a 
text that is being recited to him; these jottings are not writing, not connected by rules 
with the words in the text and yet 'without these jottings he is unable to reproduce the 
text'; these jottings would 'not be a rendering of the text, not a translation, so to speak, 
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in another symbolism. The text would not be stored up in the jottings. And why 
should it be stored up in our nervous system?' (RPP I, 908). 
 
4. Implicit vs. Explicit Memory 
Do babies "remember" their past encounters with a 
mobile when they kick spontaneously, or are they 
showing some form of implicit memory, perhaps a 
procedural or motor response? (Schacter 1996, 
174). 
 
Although there is still today in the science of memory a great deal of interest in 
encoding and storage, the focus is now on retrieval (Tulving 2002, 271), and therefore 
on use. Memory is now often defined as 'the faculty to use any type of acquired 
information' (Dalla Barba, 2000, 138). Explicit memory is said to be at work when a 
person intentionally or consciously recollects something, whereas implicit memory 
refers to the unintentional, nonconscious use of previously acquired information 
(Schacter & Tulving 1994, 11-12). As noted earlier, implicit memory is sometimes 
used synonymously with procedural memory or know-how. It is claimed to be 
evolutionarily more primitive than explicit memory, and is attributed to animals and 
infants. It is thought to be at work in conceptual domains (e.g. accessing words) as 
well as perceptual ones (e.g. recognising faces) (Schacter 1996, 189). And when past 
experiences unconsciously influence our perceptions, thoughts, and actions, such as 
riding a bicycle or playing the piano effortlessly, this is also said to be due to implicit 
memory (Schacter 1996, 5) – though we are warned not to confuse implicit memory 
with the Freudian unconscious (ibid. 190-1).  
 It is clear, then, that implicitness and absence of awareness do not prevent 
theorists from thinking it is a kind of memory that is here in question: 
 
 […] As we have come to learn that memory is not one single thing, we've 
opened up a whole new world of implicit, nonconscious memory that underlies 
our abilities to carry out effortlessly such tasks as riding a bicycle or playing a 
piano, without having to direct each movement consciously every time we 
attempt the task. (Schacter 1996, 5; my emphasis) 
 
But there are signs of worry. According to Roediger et al:  
 
... the non-declarative memory systems begin stretching our usual notion of 
memory. If you get up from your chair to leave the room, do you 'remember' how 
to walk? When you reach down to tie your shoelaces, do you have to remember 
how? When you streak across the court to execute a forehand volley, do you have 
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to remember how to do so? Using the word 'remember' seems strange in these 
contexts? (1999, 39).  
 
And Alan Baddeley wonders whether the whole range of implicit learning systems 
that have been contrasted to the episodic system 'should be referred to as memory 
systems at all, as they typically involve relatively automatic retrieval processes that 
are often not under the direct control of the subject' (1999, 516; original emphasis).  
  
4.1 Reconceptualizing, from Wittgenstein  
Baddeley's and Roediger's worry has not made waves. Neurologists still generally 
believe that 'we often remember information without being aware of it' (1999, 17). 
Even Toth notes that 'any serious account of memory must acknowledge the dramatic 
difference that obtains between "memory with awareness" and "memory without 
awareness"' (2000, 245; my emphasis). In opposition to what is the default 
assumption in neuropsychology13, I want to suggest that without some kind of 
awareness, it isn't memory that we are talking about. This is not to say that memory 
necessitates awareness of the recollective experience (what Tulving calls autonoetic 
remembering). It is to say that to put under the banner of memory the mere use of 
knowledge acquired in the past is to, as it were, under-employ the concept of memory; 
to employ it merely because the knowledge in question was acquired in the past. With 
Wittgenstein's help, I now want to argue that being unconsciously or implicitly 
influenced by our experience of a prior event does not warrant speaking of memory14, 
and that memory should only be evoked in cases of attentive remembering, of effortful 
remembering, and of memorizing. So that what Ian Hunter refers to as 'that rapid, 
automatized and depersonalized recalling which is typical for material that, as we say, 
we know well' (1957, 31) is, on my view, not a recalling at all. 
 Baddeley's and Roediger's worry is that, at the procedural level, our usual 
notion of memory is being stretched. Wittgenstein would certainly share that worry. 
He would agree that we should, in nonpathological cases, no more call riding a bike a 
case of 'remembering' than we should call walking a case of 'remembering'. So that 
                                                 
13 Cf. e.g. Tulving (1993); Schacter (1996, p no); but also Toth & Hunt (1999, 257). 
14 What about the Freudian unconscious? However much our present behaviour and personality are 
(adversely) affected by our past experiences, those experiences cannot be said to be stored in memory 
(memory is not a storage space, and experiences cannot be stored). When impressions or pictures from 
the past present themselves to us (prodded or unprodded), we rightly speak of remembering or of 
memory, but it does not follow that these memories had been previously stored as unconscious 
memories. 
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unless we are children learning, or adults relearning (after, say, a stroke), to walk or 
tie our shoelaces or ride a bike, these are all skills that we've acquired and perform 
without the use of memory. We do not, as normal adults, remember how to walk, tie 
our shoelaces, or ride a bike before or during our performance of these things. In such 
cases, we would not speak of memory, but of know-how, skill, or capacity. 
 Wittgenstein's worry, however, would not be limited to the procedural level; 
he would protest that our usual notion of memory is being stretched across all the so-
called memory systems, and that many manifestations of so-called declarative 
memory – semantic and autobiographical (or episodic) – should not be regarded as 
manifestations of memory at all. Throughout his work, Wittgenstein often excludes 
memory (or recognition) as necessarily prefacing our use of words and skills, and he 
generally regards memory as superfluous in most explanations. But more specifically 
in his last work, On Certainty, he logically excludes it – and in fact, any other 
epistemic process – from prefacing our assurance about any of our basic beliefs – such 
beliefs as are included by neuroscientists in semantic and autobiographical memory.  
 Very briefly: in On Certainty, Wittgenstein takes our basic beliefs or 
certainties to be ungrounded, unjustified certainties: 'At the foundation of well-
founded belief lies belief that is not founded' (OC 253). He compares these basic 
beliefs to 'hinges' on which the door of inquiry turns15, making them noncognitive 
certainties that logically underpin our cognitive inquiries. Some of these certainties 
are natural, instinctual or animal-like certainties (OC 359) that are never taught, or 
even articulated as such – that is, not articulated qua certainties; e.g. 'I have a body', 'I 
can move', 'I cannot walk through other people'. Such sentences are only artificial 
verbal renderings of what are in fact nonpropositional certainties: here, to be certain 
does not imply that one can formulate the sentences or even understand the words that 
compose them. A one-year old child not yet in possession of language shows that she 
is endowed with such certainties by using her body, reacting to other people, avoiding 
people rather than attempting to walk through them etc.16 Other hinges are acquired, 
                                                 
15 I have elsewhere (cf. Moyal-Sharrock 2004/2007, Chapter 5) classified these into linguistic, local, 
universal and personal hinges. It turns out that these classifications roughly correspond to what is 
deemed to be the content of semantic memory (linguistic, local, universal hinges), and episodic (or 
autobiographical) memory (personal hinges). 
16 Later, when she comes to use language, hinges will regulate the child's speaking within the bounds 
of sense in the same way they now regulate her acting within the bounds of sense. It must be stressed 
that Wittgenstein sees logic or grammar as rooted in instinct and action: "I want to regard man here as 
an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct and ratiocination. As a creature in a 
primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of communication needs no apology from 
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but where hinges are acquired, assimilation is effected through some form of 
conditioning, not propositional learning. They are either explicitly acquired – e.g. 
through cultural training or educational drill (e.g. 'This is (what we call) the sky'), or 
they are implicitly assimilated – without any training or often no formulation at all – 
through something like repeated exposure (e.g. 'People sometimes lie'). So that, 
although we can put them into words for heuristic purposes, such as pedagogical 
training or philosophical discussion, these basic certainties are nonpropositional and 
ineffable qua certainties. They only show themselves in what we say and do. 
 The next two sections aim to show that some of what neuropsychologists call 
semantic and autobiographical memories are in fact basic certainties that are not 
susceptible of recall in ordinary (e.g. nonpathological) circumstances. This is not to 
say that these certainties cannot be modified or rendered obsolete (and would then be 
susceptible of recall). If, say, it were decreed that the word 'table' would be replaced in 
English usage by another word, we would unlearn the word 'table', such that in twenty 
years it may well require some effort to recall it. Hinges can be unhinged, but as long 
as they are hinges, they are not susceptible of recall – or forgetfulness: 'Suppose a 
man could not remember whether he had always had five fingers or two hands? 
Should we understand him? Could we be sure of understanding him?' (OC 157). Any 
'forgetfulness' here, or even (genuine) hesitation, would be the sign of 'a mental 
disturbance, perhaps a transient one' (OC 71)17. 
 
4.2 ‘Semantic’ Hinges 
… neither do the spoken words occur to me [when 
I'm reading] as if, say, something reminded me of 
them. (PI 165) 
 
What neuroscientists refer to as semantic memory comprises our general knowledge 
about the world, concepts, rules and language. This is covered first of all by 
                                                                                                                                           
us. Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination" (OC 475). See also PG, pp. 62-3. This is 
the subject of my "Logic in Action: Wittgenstein's Logical Pragmatism and the Impotence of 
Scepticism", Philosophical Investigations 26:2 (April 2003), 125-148. 
17 Similarly hinges are immune to mistake (but not to mechanical slips, such as slips of the tongue (OC 
625) or to pathological confusion, both of which Wittgenstein prefers not to call 'mistakes'), 'In certain 
circumstances a man cannot make a mistake' (OC 155): 'How might I be mistaken in my assumption 
that I was never on the moon?' (OC 661); 'Can I be making a mistake, for example, in thinking that the 
words of which this sentence is composed are English words whose meaning I know?' (OC 158). By 
ruling out the possibility of mistake in such cases, Wittgenstein does not mean to rule out the possibility 
that someone might well believe that the words of which this sentence are composed are not English, or 
that they had been to the moon when they hadn't; only we 'should not call this a mistake, but rather a 
mental disturbance' (OC 71). 
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Wittgenstein's linguistic certainties18. The trained assimilation of language produces 
an indubitable certainty about certain words: 
 
We say: if a child has mastered language – and hence its application – it must 
(…) be able to attach the name of its colour to a white, black, red or blue object 
without the occurrence of any doubt. (OC 522) 
 
And if there is no occurrence of doubt, this renders otiose the presence of 
remembering. Indeed, '[i]t is simply the normal case, to be incapable of mistake about 
the designation of certain things in one's mother tongue' (OC 630). Certain things, not 
all. What Wittgenstein is saying is that we cannot normally be mistaken or uncertain 
about the meaning of our most basic words. And here, the simplicity of Wittgenstein's 
examples is important; he uses words like 'table', 'chair', 'red', 'blue', not like 
'funambulist' or 'perfunctory'. If I am a fluent speaker of English, I may hesitate, 
reflect, attempt recall before using words like „funambulist‟ and 'perfunctory', but not 
before using words such as 'red' and 'table'. It is only at this basic level that 
Wittgenstein questions that our use of words involves memory: 
 
When I talk about this table, – am I remembering that this object is called a 
"table"? (PI 601; original emphasis) 
"Is it ever true that when I call a colour „red‟ I serve myself of memory?? / 
make use of memory?/" (LPE 22) 
 
 Here, Wittgenstein outrightly questions the preconception that an act of 
memory always prefaces our use words (indeed, he wonders if it ever prefaces our use 
of some words). When as a child I first learned the use of the word 'table', I did make 
use of memory, but after years of repeated use and exposure, only a cognitive disorder 
could cause me to forget that this object is called a 'table'. Repetition has, as it were, 
drilled it into me: I no longer need, as I did when I first learned the word, to recall it 
each time; I utter it automatically, without a thought, the same way I get on a bicycle 
and start pedalling without having first to recall the technique I learned as a beginner. 
Once the technique is mastered – and this is not to say the mastery cannot break down 
or be deliberately modified – there is no question of appeal to memory. Our certainty 
                                                 
18 Or so I have called them. Examples from On Certainty are: ‘2 x 2 = 4’, ‘What the colour of human 
blood is called’, 'What is called "a slab" / "a pillar"', ‘Which colour is meant by the word blue', ‘The 
words composing this sentence are English' (OC 455, 340, 565, 545, 158) 
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in using such words is not due to the implicit, instantaneous recall of rules prior to 
each use; it is a thoughtless know-how: 
 
“Understanding a word” may mean: knowing how it is used; being able to 
apply it.” (PG p. 47) 
“I can use the word „yellow‟ is like „I know how to move the king in chess‟. 
(PG p. 49; my emphasis) 
 
 Wittgenstein's insight that the understanding of language, like that of a game 
is not a knowledge of rules, but more like the mastery of a calculus, an ability, came 
late to neuroscience on memory; only recently did performance on word identification 
come to be viewed as no longer reflecting semantic memory, but procedural memory 
(Toth & Hunt 1999, 259). All that now needs to be done, I suggest, is to stop 
regarding this know-how as memory. 
 The same goes for our basic general knowledge19. Although we may have 
once learned that human beings die or that they have brains, once these facts have 
been assimilated they are no longer (in normal circumstances) objects of recall, or of 
any cognitive process. This is also true of perceptual hinges: 
 
But when I say "It tastes exactly like sugar", in an important sense no 
remembering takes place. So I do not have grounds for my judgment or my 
exclamation. If someone asks me: "What do you mean by 'sugar'?" – I shall 
indeed try to show him a lump of sugar. And if someone asks "How do you know 
that sugar tastes like that?" I shall indeed answer him "I've eaten sugar thousands 
of times" – but that is not a justification that I give myself. (RPP II, 353) 
 
For, this kind of certainty is basic (it has become basic through habituation) and 
therefore ungrounded – though others may demand grounds from us, we are not 
certain on the strength of any grounds (there is a first/third person asymmetry here). In 
unexceptional circumstances, we do not remember that this tastes like sugar or that 
this is a bottle or that what we do in restaurants is eat, drink etc. Our certainty about 
such things is as noncognitive and unjustified as a reflex action – which, again, is not 
                                                 
19 Covered in On Certainty by what I have classified as local hinges; e.g.: ‘There is an island, 
Australia', 'The earth is round', ‘Trains normally arrive in a railway station’ (OC 159, 291, 339) – and 
universal hinges; e.g.: ‘The earth exists’, ‘Things don’t systematically disappear when we’re not 
looking’, ‘If someone’s head is cut off, the person will be dead and not live again’, ‘Trees do not 
gradually change into men and men into trees’, ‘I have a brain’, ‘I am a human being’, ‘I have 
forbears' (OC 209, 234, 274, 513,159, 4, 234). 
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to say that our certainty cannot be unlearned or modified, the same way our reflexes 
can be retrained20. 
 
4.3 ‘Autobiographical (Episodic)’ Hinges  
 
If you tell me your name, is that a piece of 
autobiographical memory? (Baddeley 1992, 13) 
 
Similarly, for Wittgenstein, basic autobiographical facts are not objects of memory, 
but noncognitive certainties that constitute the ungrounded starting points of what it 
makes sense for an individual to say of herself21. In On Certainty, he writes:  
  
For months I have lived at address A, I have read the name of the street and 
the number of the house countless times, have received countless letters here and 
given countless people the address. If I am wrong about it, the mistake is hardly 
less than if I were (wrongly) to believe I was writing Chinese and not German. 
(OC 70) 
 
 Autobiographical certainties resemble truths which I know, but although, from 
a third-person perspective, these are truths which can be known, that is not how I 
relate to them. I do not have a cognitive rapport with my autobiographical certainties; 
they are not derived from reflection or memory.  
 
If someone asks me what I have been doing in the last two hours, I answer 
him straight off and I don't read the answer off from an experience I am having. 
And yet one says that I remembered, and that this is a mental process. (RPP I, 
105) 
One might also marvel that one can answer the question "What did you do 
this morning?" – without looking up historical traces of activity or the like. Yes; I 
answer, and wouldn't even know that this was only possible through a special 
mental process, remembering, if I were not told so. (RPP I, 106) 
 
For although one calls this 'remembering', it is no more remembering than the 
following is a case of recognizing: 'Asked "Did you recognize your desk when you 
entered your room this morning?" – I should no doubt say "Certainly!" And yet it 
would be misleading to say that an act of recognition had taken place' (PI 602). 
                                                 
20 Nor is the expression not susceptible of slips of the tongue, the way even the most expert typists 
mistype some words. 
21 E.g.: ‘I come from such and such a city’, ‘For months I have lived at address A’, ‘I have never been 
on the moon’, ‘I have just had lunch', 'The person opposite me is my old friend so and so' (OC 67, 70, 
419, 111, 659, 613) – these, I have called personal hinges. 
  
 
21 
 Some basic autobiographical facts – e.g. 'My name is Danièle', 'I live in 
London', 'I have no children', 'I speak French' – cannot, in normal circumstances, be 
the product of recall. That my automatic assurance of these facts is vulnerable to 
amnesia22 does not make them, in non-pathological circumstances, a product of 
memory, or even disposed to be recalled23.  
 What is it then that makes some autobiographical facts hinge certainties, and 
others not? Why is my having been to Paris a hinge for me, not susceptible of error or 
hesitation or recall (though, of course, details of my individual stays in Paris are thus 
susceptible), but not my having been, say, to Montelimar? Absence of hesitation, 
automaticity may be achieved through repetition or drill, but they will be greatly 
assisted by a high degree of salience (proximity, familiarity, simplicity etc.). Paris has 
been salient in my life: I have lived, studied and lectured there; I regularly visit my 
Parisian friends and colleagues; have several times been to the Musée Guimet and the 
Louvre etc. But the fact that I can give a list of reasons for my certainty does not mean 
that I, myself, have come to this certainty from following a line of reasoning (again, 
first/third person asymmetry). As for Montelimar, I have often driven past it on my 
way to the south of France and remember the lure of its world-class nougat, but not 
whether it ever succeeded into making me swerve into the city.  
 Temporal and spatial proximity also contribute to hinge certainty: I may not be 
certain about which day last week I went to the theatre and may have to tax my 
memory to find out, but – all being otherwise well with me – I would have not a 
moment's hesitation about having been to the theatre an hour ago. I would no more 
                                                 
22 Amnesia affects some parts of the brain and those have been termed 'autobiographical memory', 
'long-term storage', 'declarative memory' etc. This makes it sound as if amnesia is an erasing of the 
memory tape or an emptying of the memory box, whereas memory is an ability. It isn't that the film has 
gone blank or blurry, but that we are unable to recall. Again, as Bennett and Hacker explain, it isn't that 
declarative and non-declarative memories are stored in different brain areas, for there is no such thing 
as storing memories in the brain, but '[r]ather the capacity to remember various kinds of things is 
causally dependent on different brain areas and on synaptic modifications in these areas' (2003, 159). 
Here again, confusion results from the failure to distinguish the retention of an ability from the neural 
conditions for the possession of that ability, and from the storage of information in inscribed or 
otherwise recorded form (2003, 160): '… of course, it may well be the case that but for certain neural 
configurations or strengths of synaptic connections, one would not be able to remember the date of the 
Battle of Hastings and would not remember being told it. But it does not follow from that idea that what 
one remembers must be, as it were, written down in the brain, or that there must be some neural 
configuration in the brain from which one could in principle read off what is remembered. Nor can it be 
said that this neural configuration is a memory.' (ibid. 167). 
23 What is pathologically possible is not an indicator of norm. In normal circumstances, I am not 
cognitively certain of having a body, but noncognitively certain. Losing proprioception is a 
pathological condition that makes the only awareness I can have of my body a cognitive one, but this 
does not have any resonance on the normal case. For further discussion, see my (2004/2007, 127-29). 
For the same argument applied to autism and dyssemia, cf. Moyal-Sharrock (2007). 
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hesitate or reflect here than I would to assert that I am not at the theatre right now or 
that I have often been to Paris. Any hesitation or forgetfulness here would translate 
not uncertainty, but some form of pathology.  
 
5. Mnemonic Effort and Attention 
I certainly agree with Jason Leboe (personal communication, 2007) that events in 
one's past determine our current success in engaging in virtually every thought and 
behaviour possible, but I do not find this reason enough to envisage every learned 
pattern of thought or behaviour as involving memory. The acquisition of these 
patterns may have involved memory at some point, and this may be ground enough to 
see them as continuing to be products of memory, but this is only trivial ground. To 
suggest that the degree of a current task's automaticity depends on how much 
experience has supported the performance of that task (and so the rapidity and 
efficiency of our current mental processes reflect the level of memory's contribution) 
is to say no more than that memory has played a role in the achievement of certainty, 
not that it continues to do so in the subsequent deployment of all our behaviour and 
thought.  
 Defining memory as 'the use of prior experience to guide current thought and 
behaviour' (Leboe 2007) or 'the faculty to use any type of acquired information' (Dalla 
Barba 2000, 138); and defining remembering as 'the use of knowledge retained' 
(Bennett & Hacker 2003, 156) suggests that we use memory for just about everything 
we think and do, making memory so pervasive a concept as to be useless or 
meaningless. I suggest inserting the single word 'attentive' to these definitions, making 
memory 'the attentive use of prior experience to guide current thought and behaviour', 
thereby precluding speaking of remembering where there is only automaticity. To 
speak of memory, there must also occur what I would call mnemonic effort or, at least, 
mnemonic attention. 
 Examples of mnemonic efforts are concentration, focus or, more elaborately, 
the little tricks we use in trying to remember a name (e.g. I suspect it starts with the 
letter „B‟, and run through the whole gamut: BA, BE, BO… until the word springs to 
mind: „Borden!‟); or in trying to recall what we set out to do (e.g. returning to the spot 
where we first thought of it). But what about unprompted memories – where one 
remembers a situation or occurrence 'at a moment' (RPP I, 837) – as when a mental 
picture of last night's family dinner, or a thought I had yesterday for this paper, 
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spontaneously come to mind? Here, where no mnemonic effort is made, what we 
might call mnemonic attention is paid. That is, we attend to the mental picture of last 
night's dinner or yesterday's thought as something that is being, as it were, revisited – 
as opposed, say, to an imagined picture, or to a thought never before envisaged. 
Indeed, the idea that a picture of last night's dinner must have been stored if it is to be 
able to spring to mind weakens its hold when we think that imagined pictures can, as 
it were, 'come from nowhere'. We think that a memory picture must have been stored 
because we think of it as a 'reproduction' or replica, which therefore must in some 
way contain the original. But not only do we usually remember the original scene or 
event with very little detail; and indeed, often misremember it24, the idea that an 
imprint of the original must be stored in order for the original to be 'reproduced' is 
based on a mechanistic picture of human abilities, and on grammatical confusions 
often prompted by words like 'storage' and 'retrieval'. 
What neuroscientists have called implicit memory seems to me very close to 
what Wittgenstein has described in On Certainty as an attitudinal assurance that is 
either instinctual or automatic, and that should therefore be envisaged not as a product 
of memory (in any nontrivial sense), but more in terms of reflex action. To the 
objection voiced to me that this attempt to oust automatic linguistic and nonlinguistic 
behaviour from the realm of memory seems alien to the Wittgensteinian spirit, which 
tends to expand rather than restrict concepts, I would reply that Wittgenstein has 
expanded where expansion was needed (cf. section 2), and that he never meant family 
resemblance concepts to be a carte blanche for groupings of heterogeneous concepts. 
Rather than contribute to the homogenisation of memory, I believe On Certainty 
shows differences to those who see memory everywhere. 
                                                 
24 Exact reproduction and verbatim recall are rare instances of recall; they often demand by rote  or 
focussed memorization, and  are seldom conditions for successful remembering. As Tulving notes, 
memory can be absolutely veridical, as in memorized poems, speeches, dates, addresses, phone 
numbers and passwords that we can recall, but 'a good part of the activity of memory consists not in 
reproduction, or even in reconstruction, but in sheer reconstruction. And constructed memories do not 
always correspond to reality' (2002, 273).  
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